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FREEZING THE COMPANY CHARTER 
ERICKADES* 
When legislatures alter corporate, partnership, and other business 
entity statutes, they simultaneously amend the governing document 
of all entities of that type formed within the jurisdiction. In many 
circumstances these business entities may wish to retain existing 
rules for internal governance. This Article offers a novel tool for 
firms wishing to so manage their own legal transitions: the 
"charter freeze." A freeze provision in the company charter 
declares that future (non-mandatory) changes in relevant statutes 
have no effect on the firm. Owners may affirmatively adopt the 
new rules, but choose to exercise complete control over their 
adoption vel non of legal innovation. This Article argues that 
current law permits a firm to adopt charter freezes and 
demonstrates situations in which freezes are socially desirable. 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 112 
I. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF ENABLING TRANSITIONS & 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FREEZING ................................................... 115 
II. POSITIVELAW: AREFREEZESLEGAL? .................................. 120 
A. The Case Against the Legality of the Freeze ....................... 120 
1. Mandatory Transition Provisions .................................. 120 
2. Reserved Power Provisions ............................................ 121 
B. The Case Supporting the Legality of the Freeze ................. 123 
1. The Enabling Nature of Corporate Law ...................... 123 
2. The Presumption of Legislative Prospectivity & 
Enabling Rules ................................................................ 127 
III. NORMATIVEANALYSIS: THElNTERACTIONOF 
TRANSffiON POLICY & ENABLING RULES .............................. 130 
A. Transition Policy & the Inapplicability of Conventional 
Approaches ............................................................................ 131 
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan. I 
thank Peter Henning and participants at a Florida State University Law School faculty 
workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. I dedicate this Article to the memory of 
Steve Schulman. He ate more of my Milky Way bars than everyone else combined, but in 
return gave me invaluable lessons on both corporate law and other matters of true 
importance. 
HeinOnline -- 79 N.C. L. Rev. 112 2000-2001
112 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
B. Inapplicability of Justifications for Mandatory Rules of 
Substantive Corporate Law .................................................. 135 
C. Concerns External to Companies ......................................... 138 
1. Creditor Protection & the Freeze .................................. 139 
2. Network Extemalities ..................................................... 140 
D. Public Corporations: Which Way Are We Racing? .......... 144 
E. Close Corporations & Other Privately-Held Firms ........... 150 
F. Should the Freeze be the Default Transition Rule for 
Corporate Law? ..................................................................... 152 
CONCLUSION .•...•.•............•.......•........•..••..••..•........•...•...•.•........•..•...•.•....• 154 
INTRODUCTION 
Whenever a legislature amends a state's corporation, 
partnership, or other business entity1 statute, it simultaneously 
amends the charter2 of each and every such firm in the jurisdiction. 
While this state of affairs often surprises and disturbs those observers 
uninitiated to corporate law, it follows from the primary justification 
for devoting state resources to business entity law. Modem company 
law theory views most provisions of corporate, partnership, and other 
entity laws merely as off-the-rack enabling rules for internal 
governance, which most firms would adopt if they considered each 
issue.3 Enabling rules are default rules that apply to companies that 
choose not to adopt alternative provisions.4 Public promulgation of 
1. This Article uses "company" as shorthand for "business entity"; thus, company 
denotes a corporation, a partnership, a limited partnership, a limited liability partnership, 
a limited liability company, a business trust, or any other business entity. 
2. This Article uses "charter" to denote the foundational document of all types of 
business organizations. In common parlance, there are distinct names for each-e.g., 
partnership agreements for partnerships, articles of organization for limited liability 
companies. The assertion that statutory amendments alter existing charters is not merely 
a characterization of effect; the leading corporate code states that "(t]his [statute] and all 
amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every 
corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991 & Supp. 1998); see also REVISED UNIF. 
P'SfllP Acr § 103, 6 U.L.A. 16 (1995 & Supp. 2000) ("To the extent the partnership 
agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners 
.... "); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 103, 6A U.L.A. 435 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (using 
language virtually identical to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 103). 
3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991) 
("[C]orporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate 
ventures can save the cost of contracting."). 
4. The exceptional areas are those in which company laws include mandatory rules-
rules from which companies cannot opt out. See infra Parts III.B, III.C (discussing rules 
designed to protect third parties and to facilitate contracting within the firm). Focusing 
mainly on intra-firm enabling rules comports with the modem view that company law 
principally addresses contractual issues within the business entity. Thus, the law of public 
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widely-preferred default rules saves business entities the time and 
cost of re-inventing desirable internal business governance rules. As 
long as the legislature does its job, most firms will invite the continual 
stream of statutory amendments that alter their charters. 
Even if the legislature always properly selects default (enabling) 
rules, firms with uncommon preferences will opt out of some of the 
statutory defaults. Voting, however, is an imperfect device for 
owners desiring to opt out of statutory changes. It is expensive and 
poses significant collective action problems.5 Further, amending the 
firm's charter may require a supermajority vote, giving a minority the 
benefit of new statutory rules for which they never could have 
mustered sufficient votes. 
This Article suggests a novel device for firms wary of legislative 
innovation-a freeze provision declaring that non-mandatory 
amendments to the company's statute have no effect on the firm's 
internal rules of governance until adopted by an affirmative vote. 
Freeze provisions enable firms to reject all legislative innovation in 
enabling rules ex ante. If legislatures regularly select suboptimal 
default rules, a freeze provision may become attractive to firms 
beyond those with unusual preferences. Entities worried about 
amendments to specific statutory enabling provisions might adopt 
limited versions, freezing out only the relevant code sections.6 
Given the current flux in many areas of business entity law, the 
potential for freeze provisions is particularly relevant. Over the last 
twenty-five years, corporate law has changed significantly on a 
number of important issues? In the near future, many states may 
corporations deals with those rules "that primarily govern the relationship between a 
company's managers and investors." Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 547 (1990). Analogously, most 
other business entity law (e.g., close corporations, partnerships, and limited liability 
companies), where owners are managers, primarily deals with relations among the owners. 
5. For a cogent summary of these problems with shareholder democracy, see 
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ 9.5, at 389-400 (1986); see also JESSE H. 
CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 521-28 (4th ed. 1995) 
(discussing, inter alia, "rational apathy" and "free rider" problems in corporate 
democracy); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 171-72 (discussing problems 
with shareholder monitoring); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
MICH. L. REv. 520 passim (1990) (same). 
6. Limited freezes may fail to prevent change effectively because creative scriveners 
can usually find ways to sidestep the restriction. See infra text accompanying notes 140-42 
(describing the difficulty of making a partial freeze effective against creative 
draftsmanship). 
7. Delaware and many other states have made directors' and managers' duty of care 
waiveable in the charter. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1999). Similarly, both statutes and case law on 
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replace the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) with a recently 
promulgated revised statute, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA).8 Limited liability company (LLC) statutes, providing 
default rules for an entity that did not exist twenty-five years ago, 
continue to evolve rapidly.9 Part I begins this Article's analysis by 
discussing why transitions in business entity law's enabling rules differ 
from transitions in other mandatory areas of law. Part II argues that, 
although debatable, existing law likely does not prohibit charter 
freezes. Part III assesses the policy arguments for and against the 
freeze. Finally, after explaining why conventional normative analysis 
of transitions does not apply to enabling bodies of law,10 this Article 
demonstrates that none of the reasons for mandatory rules of 
business entity law justify a mandatory rule against charter freezes. 11 
The desirability of the freeze for public companies12 depends on 
whether their state of incorporation is engaged in a "race to the top" 
permissible defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover offer has changed 
significantly. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-55 
(Del. 1990) (refining the Unocal standard); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (permitting defensive measures only if proportional to some threat 
to the corporation or its shareholders). In the wake of the Supreme Court's approval of 
some anti-takeover statutes, C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 70-71 
(1987) (finding Indiana's control share acquisition statute constitutonal), most states now 
have comprehensive anti-takeover legislation. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 & 
Supp. 1998); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2000). The standard 
for reviewing decisions on derivative suits by special litigation committees continues to 
evolve. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) 
(requiring the court to apply its own independent business judgment, in addition to 
examining independence and good faith of a special litigation committee, in deciding 
whether or not to uphold committee decisions), with Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 
P.2d 629, 638 (Colo. 1999) (requiring the trial court to give deference to the special 
committee if it finds that the committee was disinterested, independent, and employed 
reasonable procedures in its analysis). 
8. See UNIF. P'SHIP Acr, 6 U.L.A 1-124 (1995 & Supp. 2000). The Revised Act was 
promulgated in 1993. As of 2000, twenty-six of the fifty states had adopted it. 6 id. at 1 
tbl. 
9. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws & 
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 947, 951-52 (1995) (tracing significant 
changes in limited liability company (LLC) law throughout the country between 1991 and 
1995). 
10. See infra Part III.A. 
11. See infra Part III.B, III. C. 
12. In addition to corporations with widespread (public) ownership, some limited 
partnerships and other business entities qualify as public companies. Limited partnerships 
"may have up to several hundred limited partners ... who ... do not expect to participate 
actively in management." CHOPER ET AL., supra note 5, at 690. Joint stock associations 
and business trusts are other business entities that may possess the key attribute of a 
public corporation-a relatively large number of owners uninvolved in the operation of 
the business. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 109-25 (3d ed. 1983). 
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favoring shareholders, or a "race to the bottom" favoring 
management. In a race to the top world, a charter freeze protects 
management from amendments likely to favor shareholders, and 
hence is undesirable. Conversely, in a race to the bottom world, the 
freeze performs the desirable task of preventing management from 
obtaining rules that they cannot obtain by shareholder voteY Public 
companies and privately-held businesses alike may find the freeze 
useful if the legal profession possesses enough influence to pass 
business entity rules that generate excessive planning and litigation 
fees. To the extent general corporate law focuses on public 
corporations, close corporations will find the freeze useful in keeping 
irrelevant or positively harmful statutory innovations out of their 
charters. 
Widespread use of the freeze would result in a much more 
heterogeneous company-law landscape-contemporaneous entity 
statutes would not apply to firms that had "frozen in" superceded 
laws. Recent work on network and learning externalities strongly 
suggests that it is efficient to offer firms a wider choice of law for 
internal governance, and, thus, that worries about this possible 
fragmentation of company law are misplaced.14 Although many of 
the grounds for permitting the freeze also weigh in favor of making it 
the default rule for company legal transitions, there is a paradox-the 
more desirable the freeze, the less likely lawmakers will be to choose 
it as the default transition rule.15 
I. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF ENABLING TRANSffiONS & 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FREEZING 
In almost every other area of law, legal transitions are 
mandatory. The legislatures and courts dictate whether a new rule 
will be fully retroactive or whether to provide some form of transition 
relief (such as grandfathering pre-existing activity at odds with the 
new rule or providing actors a window of time to comply with the new 
rule). People can, of course, try to anticipate and plan for legal 
change-expected taxes depress the price of targeted assets and 
expected zoning changes alter the price of affected parcels.16 Private 
13. See infra Part III.D. 
14. See infra Part III.E. 
15. See infra Part III.F. 
16. The technical word for such planning is "capitalization": actors factor all 
conceivable risks and rewards into the prices they pay for assets. For an accessible but 
penetrating discussion of capitalization in the context of tax shelters, see Boris I. Bittker, 
Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, in 
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parties, however, can do nothing to alter the transition rules chosen 
by lawmakers. Indeed, permitting private parties prospectively to opt 
out of changes in tax, zoning, and most other types of laws would 
defeat the purpose of legal change and lock in the status quo forever. 
This is not so for company law transitions. There is no question 
that a company can effectively freeze its charter on a specific (non-
mandatory) issue simply by including a charter provision on point. 
For example, consider Acme Corporation's requirement of an eighty 
percent vote to consummate a merger in a state where the default 
rule is a two-thirds vote. If the legislature amends the statutory 
default to a simple majority, the internal rules of firms without a 
charter provision on point change. Acme, however, is unaffected: its 
eighty percent requirement trumps future as well as present statutory 
defaults. Generally, firms adopting specific charter provisions varying 
from statutory defaults effectively freeze out all future legal 
transitions on that particular issue.17 
Freezing the entire charter, then, is redundant protection from 
legal change for those matters controlled by specific charter 
provisions. It is not by any means, however, a fruitless transition tool. 
Including a specific charter provision on every issue is expensive and 
undermines the entire purpose of business entity statutes-saving 
firms the cost of re-inventing sound rules for internal governance. 
For the multitude of issues on which a company's charter is silent, a 
general freeze prevents legislative action from changing the 
company's rules. For example, assume that Acme had no specific 
charter provision on merger votes, but did have a provision freezing 
its charter against all legal change. After the legislature changed the 
default required merger vote from two-thirds to a simple majority, 
Acme would retain the old two-thirds rule.18 
COLLECTED LEGAL ESSAYS 547, 547-52 (Boris I. Bittker ed., 1989). 
17. Under a provision in Pennsylvania's corporate code, however, firms wishing to 
freeze out statutory changes cannot simply include a cite to an existing code section. 
Pennsylvania mandates adoption of newly enacted rules by firms whose charters cite 
specific statutory provisions: "A reference in the articles or bylaws or other organic 
documents of an association to any provision of law supplied or repealed by this title shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the superceding provision of this title." 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 101(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). This rule is likely suboptimal. 
Incorporators who take the time and effort to cite explicitly a default rule that would 
govern them if their charter remained silent on the issue likely find the cited rule of 
particular importance. This is strong evidence that the incorporators would reject any 
change to the statutory default rule. 
18. A more subtle case arises if lawmakers amend the company statute from silence 
on a particular issue to some default rule. Specific provisions in company charters will 
trump whatever new default is enacted. If the charter of a company with a general freeze 
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Without discussing positive legality or normative merits, it is 
important to note that freezing entire company charters does not 
frustrate the purpose of company law-choosing default rules desired 
by most firms.19 As long as lawmakers do their job effectively, the 
plurality of companies will not want to freeze their charters. Further, 
freezes adopted by other firms have no obvious impact on the 
plurality.20 Thus, private choices of transition rules do not undermine 
the purpose of company law. 
Although the majority of company laws are enabling, there are a 
few mandatory company laws. These include taxation and rules 
governing relationships with third parties. Just as in the non-
company law context, allowing firms to plan around or opt out of 
transitions to mandatory rules may undermine the policy behind the 
law.21 No problem arises, however, for transitions from mandatory to 
enabling laws.22 Such transitions do raise some interesting issues and 
surprising results. 
If a charter contains a general freeze when the legislature 
replaces a mandatory rule with an enabling rule (or simply erases the 
mandatory rule), strict construction of the freeze dictates that the firm 
will retain the pre-existing mandatory rule. For example, imagine 
that Beta Corporation had a charter freeze and was governed by a 
state statute mandating that two-thirds of all shareholders approve 
mergers. If the legislature subsequently abolished the supermajority 
has no relevant provision, however, the effect of the new statutory default is unclear. 
While the firm's freeze evidences an intent to reject all legal change, the firm had no pre-
existing rule on point since there was originally no statutory default. Because there is no 
old rule to retain, arguably the only possible choice is the new statutory default. 
19. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (describing the enabling nature of 
company law). 
20. Part III.E infra considers in greater detail whether freezes by some companies can 
have a negative effect on other companies and concludes that such effects are minimal or 
nonexistent. 
21. It is also possible that the new mandatory rule may disrupt existing company 
arrangements; in such cases "it may be appropriate to make the new provision binding 
only on firms that affirmatively elect to be governed by it." Larry E. Ribstein, Changing 
Statutory Forms, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 11, 29 (1997) [hereinafter Ribstein, 
Statutory Forms]. Although the very policy reasons supporting the freeze, see infra Part 
III, buttress this view, reserved power clauses included in most business entity statutes 
give states virtually plenary power to alter existing company charters by statutory 
amendment. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991 & Supp. 1998) ("This chapter 
may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the legislature ... all amendments thereof 
shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation .... "). 
22. Third parties may object to the elimination of mandatory rules designed for their 
protection, and the very possibility of repeal may undermine the value of mandatory rules 
as a means for firms to bond-i.e., commit to perform some acts and forego others. 
Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 21, at 26-27. 
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requirement, Beta arguably would retain the two-thirds requirement. 
This result may seem surprising and counterintuitive. To the extent. 
however, that a given mandatory rule imposes costs without benefits 
on firms, there may be grounds to infer that a company did not intend 
to freeze the mandatory rule into its charter. In any event, companies 
can make their preferences explicit by including a clause in their 
freeze provision declaring the desire to free themselves of any (or 
some) repealed mandatory rules. 
The repeal of a mandatory company law may revive charter 
provisions that existed at the time when lawmakers first enacted the 
mandatory rule.23 For example, imagine that Beta, like Acme, had a 
charter provision requiring an eighty percent shareholder vote to 
approve of a merger when the legislature mandated a two-thirds vote. 
When the legislature repeals its two-thirds rule, is Beta's eighty 
percent rule revived? 
This situation is closely analogous to the question of whether a 
judicial decision overruling a previous decision holding a statute 
unconstitutional revives the statute. Almost without exception, 
courts have held that the repealing decision does indeed restore the 
statute.24 The logic behind these decisions is highly formal-while 
courts can bar application of a statute, they cannot erase the pages of 
the statute books.25 In the words of one court, statutes are 
"dormant[,] but not dead" when declared unconstitutionai.26 
Whether the formal justification for reviving statutes once held 
unconstitutional applies to company charters is unclear. Legislatures 
usually retain the power to amend business charters27 and thus may 
have the power to render privately-drafted provisions not just 
23. The possibility of revival also touches on the possibility that company charter 
provisions, like laws, perhaps should not be enforced after long periods of desuetude. 
24. See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the 
Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1908-15 (1993) 
(collecting cases). 
25. See id. at 1913-14 ("Almost all ... courts that have addressed the issue of whether 
a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have ... us[ed] ... 
formalistic analysis."). 
26. Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d. 96, 97 (D.C. 1952) (emphasis added). Treanor and 
Sperling criticize this formal approach because it ignores how rational parties will behave 
in light of the initial decision striking down a statute as unconstitutional. As long as 
reversals are rare, opponents of such statutes have little reason to devote valuable time, 
effort, and political capital to the seemingly redundant task of obtaining a legislative 
repeal of the voided statute. Treanor & Sperling, supra note 24, at 1917-41. Treanor and 
Sperling would apply a version of prospective overruling and would not resuscitate the 
statute unless the legislature re-enacted it after the court reversed itself. !d. at 1907. 
27. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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dormant, but dead. Moreover, the formal rule may fly in the face of 
the likely intent of most parties. Given the cost of company elections, 
shareholders may not bother repealing a provision voided by 
statutory mandate, just as political voters may not pursue legislative 
solutions where they have obtained a judicial victory.28 
If owners anticipate such a legislative termination of a 
mandatory ru1e, they may plan ahead by enacting an anticipatory 
charter provision declaring their desire to deviate from the 
mandatory rule if and when repealed. When companies employ this 
declaratory device in combination with general freezes, however, 
there may be difficult issues of construction. For example, assume 
that Beta has no specific charter provision on the vote required to 
effectuate a merger and the legislature mandates a two-thirds vote. If 
Beta enacts a freeze followed by a declaration that it wishes to 
require an eighty percent vote for mergers, its intent is clear: 
Legislature 
mandates 
2/3ds rule 
Corporation 
enacts freeze 
Corporation 
expresses 
desire for 80% 
rule 
Legislature 
eliminates 
mandatory 
2/3ds rule 
The later specific measure in favor of an eighty percent rule 
trumps the earlier freeze that facially endorsed the existing two-thirds 
rule. If, however, the corporation enacts the freeze after expressing 
its desire for an eighty percent rule, its intent is less clear: 
Legislature 
mandates 
2/3ds rule 
Corporation 
expresses 
desire for 80% 
rule 
Corporation 
enacts freeze 
Legislature 
eliminates 
mandatory 
2/3ds rule 
The later-enacted freeze, facially, embraces the existing 
mandatory ru1e that is inconsistent with the specific charter provision 
to the contrary, even though the firm enacted the specific provision 
after the legislature adopted the mandatory rule. The counter-
argument is that the corporation never repealed the specific charter 
provision and likely simply overlooked the effect of a general freeze 
on this specific issue. 
28. Treanor & Sperling, supra note 24, at 1918-24. 
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The determinative factor in these complex transition scenarios is 
the company owner's intent. This is the touchstone of transition 
analysis in company law. The issues presented in the remainder of 
the paper, for the most part, are quite different than those just 
examined because they involve enabling (as opposed to mandatory) 
rules. Yet, the intent of company owners retains center stage. 
II. POSITIVE LAW: ARE FREEZES LEGAL? 
Although specific charter provisions in effect freeze out changes 
in statutory default rules,29 the legality of a general freeze is less 
certain. Neither legislatures, courts, nor academic commentators 
have addressed this Article's novel freeze mechanism. The 
mandatory language of transition provisions in state company codes 
and statutory provisions reserving the power to amend company 
charters provide grounds to argue that the general freeze is invalid. 
These terms seem to mandate that, where company charters are 
silent, the new rule shall apply. Arguably, a freeze frustrates this 
practice and hence should be illegal. 
After fleshing out this case against the legality of the freeze, the 
remainder of this Part provides two grounds to reject this 
interpretation of company law transition and reserved power 
provisions. First and foremost, the enabling nature of company law 
provides strong grounds to reject a constrictive reading of transition 
rules. A limited version of the dormant (but not dead) vested rights 
doctrine supports this argument. Second, the traditional presumption 
that legislation applies only prospectively is invariably followed for 
legal transitions involving enabling (as opposed to mandatory) legal 
rules. 
A. The Case Against the Legality of the Freeze 
1. Mandatory Transition Provisions 
The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) contains a 
typical transition provision: "This Act applies to all domestic 
corporations in existence on its effective date .... "3° Formally, then, 
29. See discussion supra text accompanying note 17. 
30. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 17.01 (1999). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA) and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) are similar but delay 
their application to existing entities, see REVISED UNIFORM P'SHIP Acr § 1006, 6.U.L.A. 
122 (1995); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr. § 1205, 6A U.L.A. 429 (1995), presumably to 
provide owners with time to enact specific charter provisions preserving old default rules. 
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for those issues on which a corporation's charter is silent, the default 
rules in the new act displace those in the original act. This transition 
rule does not directly declare the invalidity of a general freeze clause, 
but the official comments provide additional grounds for such a 
determination. One MBCA comment provides: "It is undesirable to 
'grandfather' existing corporations under earlier statutes since that 
results in the permanent coexistence of two different and overlapping 
systems of corporate law, with resulting confusion."31 This 
commentary does not facially invalidate freeze clauses. Wide 
adoption of freezes, however, would result in the potentially 
"permanent existence" of two or more "different and overlapping 
systems of corporate law." The MBCA comment considers the 
"resulting confusion" grounds to move all corporations to the same 
set of default rules,32 a result unachievable if any firm can adopt a 
general freeze. 
2. Reserved Power Provisions 
In addition to mandatory transition provisions, every state 
corporate code and virtually all other contemporary company statutes 
contain a section reserving the legislature's power to amend the 
statute.33 The MBCA contains a typically broad reserved power 
clause: "The [name of state legislature] has power to amend or repeal 
all or part of this Act at any time and all domestic and foreign 
corporations subject to this Act are governed by the amendment or 
repeal."34 States began using reserved power clauses in the wake of 
31. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 17.01, official cmt. (1999). The same comment also 
justifies retroactive application based on the separate rationale that the revised MBCA 
"contains few major substantive changes." Id. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 
discussed infra Part III.B.2, relies on this factor in crafting its transition rules. 
32. The extent of any confusion is questioned infra text accompanying notes 125-26. 
33. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 {1991 & Supp. 1999). The RUPA, 
promulgated in 1993, contains a reserved power clause modeled after those appearing in 
corporation statutes: "A partnership governed by this [Act] is subject to any amendment 
to or repeal of this (Act]." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 1006, 6 U.L.A. 26 (1995). 
The RUPA's precursor, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) contained no 
reserved power clause. Hence, entities formed under the UP A arguably can use the 
Contract Clause to resist alteration of enabling and even mandatory rules in the statute. 
Most LLC statutes contain reserved power clauses. E.g., DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 18-1106 (1993 & Supp. 1999). There are, however, some prominent exceptions: the 
California and New York statutes, and the ULLCA do not reserve legislative power to 
amend existing charters via statutory amendments. 
34. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 1.02 (1999). Delaware's reserved power clause carves 
out a small exception for liabilities incurred under the previous act, stating that 
amendments or repeals "shall not take away or impair any remedy under this [statute) 
against any corporation or its officers for any liability which shall have been previously 
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the Supreme Court's application of the Constitution's Contract 
Clause35 to strike down a state's attempt to modify unilaterally the 
corporate charter of Dartmouth College.36 Reserving the power to 
amend ex ante means that state legislatures have effectively destroyed 
the basis for any Contract Clause objections to changes in their 
company statutes. Reserved power clauses are not limited to 
mandatory provisions; as written, they appear to apply to enabling 
rules as well. Thus, their direct and mandatory language seems to 
trump attempts by companies to block statutory changes from 
affecting their charter by implementing charter freezes. 
Not all commentators agree that reserved power clauses give 
state legislatures unlimited power to amend existing company 
charters. Nelson Ferebee Taylor, for example, argues that reserved 
power clauses authorize amendments only to those charter provisions 
touching on relations between the state and the company. Attempts 
to alter purely private bargains struck in the charter, Taylor 
maintains, violate either the remnants of the vested rights doctrine or 
the Constitution's prohibition on the impairment of contracts.37 If 
Taylor is correct, then reserved power clauses provide no basis for 
rejecting the legality of a charter freeze. Indeed, under his reading of 
the Contract Clause, the freeze is not merely legal, it is 
constitutionally mandated.38 
incurred." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1993 & Supp. 1999). 
35. "No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
36. Trs. of Dartmouth Coli. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,650 (1819). Justice 
Story's dissent suggested that states wishing to amend corporate charters should reserve 
such rights by statute. ld. at 708 (Story, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of 
the application of the Contract Oause to corporate statutes, see Henry N. Butler & Larry 
E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767 passim 
(1989) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause and the Corporation]; Henry N. 
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 611, 631-34 (1988). 
37. Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of the Corporate Combination Law: Policy 
Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REv. 687, 996-1010 (1998). 
38. For a similar view, see Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause and the Corporation, 
supra note 36, at 782-93. 
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B. The Case Supporting the Legality of the Freeze 
1. The Enabling Nature of Corporate Law 
Modern company law is, for the most part, enabling rather than 
mandatory.39 Roberta Romano offers the following definition of, and 
justification for, enabling corporate statutes. 
Modern corporation codes tend to be enabling rather than 
mandatory statutes: they are standard form contracts 
specifying the rights and obligations of managers and 
shareholders, which can often be altered by private 
agreement to suit the circumstances of particular firms. The 
enabling approach is a function of the contractual nature of 
the corporation. Participation in a firm is voluntary; 
common stock is one of a vast array of available investment 
vehicles.40 
The same principles apply to partnerships and other types of firms. 
This is not merely an academic gloss; the enabling principle 
appears in virtually all company codes. Delaware's corporations 
statute, in a provision over thirty years old, states that a firm's articles 
of incorporation (charter) may contain "any provision for the 
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the 
corporation."41 The California and New York corporate statutes 
contain similar provisions.42 More recently drafted corporate statutes 
contain even clearer declarations of the enabling nature of corporate 
law. In addition to a provision similar to those just cited,43 Michigan's 
corporate statute, as substantially amended in 1989, declares: 
39. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
40. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 85 (1993). 
Other business entity statutes are similarly enabling, rather than mandatory, sets of rules. 
See Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 21, at 22 ("Business association statutes are 
standard form contracts that the parties can either accept or reject."). 
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1993 & Supp. 1999). 
42. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 2000) (stating that articles of 
incorporation may contain "[a]ny other provision, not in conflict with Jaw, for the 
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporations."); id. 
§ 212(b} (containing a virtually identical provision for bylaw provisions); N.Y. Bus. CORP. 
LAW§ 402(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 2000) ("The certificate of incorporation may set 
forth any provision, not inconsistent with this chapter or any other statute of this state, 
relating to the business of the corporation, its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or 
powers of its shareholders, directors, or officers."). 
43. See MICH COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.1209 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000) ("The articles 
of incorporation may contain any provision not inconsistent with this act or another 
statute of this state .... "). 
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This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies which include all of the 
following: 
(b) To provide a general corporate form for the conduct or 
promotion of a lawful business or purpose with variations 
and modifications from the form as interested parties in any 
corporation may agree upon, subject only to overriding 
interests of this state and of third parties.44 
Partnership and limited liability statutes contain similar 
statements of their enabling, as opposed to mandatory, nature.45 The 
essence of these enabling statutes is that owners of companies may 
arrange their internal affairs any way they desire; anything not 
positively barred is permitted. Because no company statute bars 
general freezes, the enabling nature of these laws provides strong 
grounds for their legality. The seemingly mandatory transition rules 
discussed in Part ll.A should apply only where a firm has adopted 
neither a specific provision at odds with the statutory default nor a 
general freeze rejecting all statutory innovation. 
Similarly, company law can harmonize reserved power clauses 
with its pervasively enabling nature. There is no doubt that the 
legislature can enact all sorts of mandatory rules that apply to existing 
companies (e.g., taxes and fees, filing requirements, and tort liability). 
These are peripheral matters; company law in the main involves rules 
44. Id. § 450.1103{b). 
45. "[R]elations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are 
governed by the partnership agreement." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP Acr § 103{a), 6 U.L.A. 
16 {1995). Section 103{b) of the RUPA, contains a short list of immutable rules governing 
relations among partners. ld. § 103{b), 6 U.L.A. 16 {1995). Even these relatively modest 
deviations from the enabling ideal have been the subject of substantial controversy, and 
some have attributed the relatively slow adoption of the RUP A to these restraints on 
partners' freedom of contract. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45 passim (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein, 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act]. 
The ULLCA contains a similar provision allowing complete freedom for owners 
in drafting an LLC's charter ("operating agreement") save for a short list of immutable 
terms. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. Acr § 103, 6A U.L.A. 434-35 {1995). The official 
comments state that, save for the exceptions, "[e]very section of this Act is simply a 
default rule, regardless of whether the language of the section appears to be otherwise 
mandatory. This approach eliminates the necessity of repeating the phrase 'unless 
otherwise agreed' in each section." I d. at 435. The Delaware Limited Liability Company 
Act explicitly states that "[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101{b) {1993 & Supp. 1999). 
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and procedures for intra-firm govemance.46 When an amendment 
changes one of the numerous statutory default rules, and a charter 
has neither a specific provision on point nor a freeze, the firm is at the 
mercy of the legislature. Given a reserved power clause, the firm 
cannot object that the legislature rewrote its charter. 
When the firm has a specific charter provision that differs from 
the new statutory default, there is no question that the specific rule 
remains valid despite the legislature's reserved power to amend. A 
general freeze provision has a similar but wider effect. It does not 
frustrate the legislature's undoubted power to adopt new mandatory 
rules, and it does not frustrate the legislature's desire to adopt new 
default rules for those firms without provisions overriding statutory 
defaults. The freeze simply operates on a broader scale than specific 
charter provisions-it announces that the firm wishes to exert 
maximal control over transitions involving enabling (voluntary) rules. 
Although reserved power clauses are read quite broadly today, 
they were once subject to significant limitations.47 The "vested rights" 
doctrine48 conceptually separated a company into two contracts. For 
relations between the state and the company, the reserved power 
clause preserved the state's power to amend unilaterally the 
company's charter.49 For relations between the owners and managers 
of the firm, however, the vested rights doctrine carved out an arena of 
contractual freedom immune to legislative innovation: 
[T]his reserved power of the State to alter or amend charters 
of incorporation, although wide, is not unlimited, and that it 
can properly be exercised only to amend a charter so far as it 
represents a contract between the corporation and the State, 
and not in respects as to which it constitutes a contract 
between the corporation and the shareholders or between 
the shareholders themselves. That is the view presently 
taken of the extent of the reserved power by many, if not 
most, of the courts which have considered the question. 5° 
Although the vested rights doctrine has fallen into disfavor as an 
illegitimate constraint on the power of the legislature to amend 
company laws,51 it contains a core insight that remains valid: for rules 
that have no effect outside of a company, the enabling nature of 
46. See supra note 4. 
47. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 951-79. 
48. See id. at 953-54. 
49. See id. 
50. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 87 A.2d 227, 232 (Pa. 1952) (footnote omitted). 
51. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 10.01(a) (1999); id. § 10.01 official cmt. 
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corporate law provides compelling grounds to permit firms to manage 
their own transitions to new statutory defaults. 
Further, a prohibition against freezes imposes unnecessary costs 
on firms that wish to use the device. A general freeze merely 
accomplishes in one fell swoop what firms may accomplish by a series 
of specific charter provisions, an expensive endeavor. A rule 
invalidating general freezes, then, would do no more than force firms 
wishing to freeze their charters to restate explicitly all statutory 
default rules in their charter-defeating in large part the economizing 
rationale for company law in the first place. 52 
The state, in its role as promulgator of company laws, is 
analogous to private firms that prepare forms for various legal 
transactions (e.g., land sales contracts, mortgages, leases, and secured 
credit agreements). In some contexts, private parties using forms 
prepared by third parties may wish to emulate the company law 
model and incorporate all innovations into their ongoing relationship. 
For example, bond indenture agreements invariably declare explicitly 
that the parties will use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) rules as they evolve, not as they existed at the time of 
issuance. 53 
In general, however, private parties using forms have no 
intention to incorporate future changes made by the third-party 
producer of the form. Mortgages, leases, and other contractual 
arrangements, without any mention of the matter, are universally 
assumed to be governed by the language within the four corners of 
each document, unaffected by later alterations by the form's 
promulgator. 
There are two lessons to draw from these examples. First, it goes 
without saying that contractual parties using a third-party form have 
complete freedom to follow or reject future alterations to the form 
and to make this decision ex ante. Second, and more importantly, if 
the parties wish to incorporate future changes, they must explicitly so 
indicate in the contract. The default rule is that future changes do not 
affect executed deals using a particular form. Thus, for almost all 
form consumers, the freeze is not only legal, it is the default rule. To 
the extent company law is no more than a form contract, this default 
supports the permissibility of the freeze. 54 
52. See supra notes 39-45. 
53. See Richard Leftwich, Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from 
Private Lending Agreements, 58 Accr. REv. 23, 36 (1983). 
54. Whether the freeze should be and can be the default transition rule for company 
law is discussed infra Part III.F. 
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2. The Presumption of Legislative Prospectivity & Enabling Rules 
If other enabling areas of law permitted the freeze or similar 
privately-adopted advance specification of transition rules, it would 
be easier to make the case for freezing company charters. The device, 
however, appears to be entirely novel. This Section, using the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as an example, demonstrates 
that combining the fact that (a) statutes presumptively operate only 
prospectively, with (b) the very nature of enabling rules (like the 
U.C.C. or company statutes), implies that the freeze is legal. 
The basic idea is simple: prospective legislation that parties may 
opt into is functionally equivalent to a freeze. Prospectivity ensures 
that legislative action does not rewrite existing agreements; the ability 
to opt in means that contractual parties may, by consent, select the 
new rule.55 This is the very state of affairs produced by freeze clauses 
in corporate charters. While company law is largely statutory, judicial 
decisions also play an important role. The last portion of this Part 
considers the efficacy of attempting to freeze out judicially-generated 
changes in the law. · 
A well established principle is " 'that statutes operate only 
prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively.' "56 In 
at least one prominent mandatory statutory regime, this presumption 
may be honored more in the breach: revisions to the tax code often 
operate retroactively by their language, and virtually always in their 
effect. 57 
In enabling areas of the law, however, "[t]he principle that 
statutes operate only prospectively" does indeed govern transitions. 
The U.C.C., perhaps the most widely used body of enabling rules, has 
included transition rules excluding virtually all retroactive effects 
when it introduces major changes in the law. The first version of the 
55. It is true that parties to a company contract may, per their charter, opt into new 
statutory rules with only a majority or supermajority vote, which is short of the unanimity 
required to rewrite standard contracts. Parties forming a company or buying an interest, 
however, are at least on constructive notice that a majority or perhaps a supermajority has 
the power to amend the charter. 
56. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994) (quoting United 
States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)). It is unclear whether there are 
constitutional limits on the extent of legislative retroactivity. In United States v. Carlton, 
512 U.S. 26 (1994), the Court permitted retroactive elimination of a tax deduction, noting 
that Congress has a long history of adopting tax rules with relatively short retroactive 
periods. ld. at 35. Justice O'Connor, concurring, warned that government interests in 
retroactivity at some point become outweighed by taxpayers' interest in "finality and 
repose." Id. at 37-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, concurring, described the 
outcome of the case as "harsh and oppressive." !d. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
57. See, e.g., Carlton, 511 U.S. at 30-33. 
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U.C.C., promulgated in 1962, unambiguously declared that its 
extensive legal innovations "[a]pplied to transactions entered into and 
events occurring after [enactment]."58 It specifically stated that acts 
displaced by the U.C.C. (such as the Uniform Sales Act59 and the 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act60) would ·continue to govern 
transactions predating the U.C.C.61 The key moment was the time of 
contract formation, not performance: "The conclusion that the Code 
does not apply to transactions occurring before its effective date is 
not altered by the circumstances that a further fact or transaction 
relating to the pre-Code transaction takes place after the effective 
date of the Code."62 Given this uniform prospectivity, there would 
have been no reason to look askance at a private freeze clause in a 
contract governed by the statutes displaced by the U.C.C. Such a 
privately-chosen provision would have been consistent with (indeed, 
functionally redundant with) the transition rules included in the 
publicly-enacted U.C.C. 
The transition rules for the 1972 amendments to the U.C.C. seem 
to fly in the face of the original 1962 prospective approach: with a 
few exceptions, the 1972 amendments applied retroactively.63 The 
drafters, however, did not believe that the amendments contained 
many truly new rules of law; "[u]nless a change in law has clearly 
been made, the provision of [the amended U.C.C.] shall be deemed 
declaratory of the meaning of the [original U.C.C.]."64 By describing 
the amendments as "declaratory," the drafters in effect analogized 
58. U.C.C. § 10-101 (1962) (amended 2000). 
59. UNIF. SALES Acr (1906) (amended 1922). 
60. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Acr (1896). 
61. U.C.C. § 10-102 (2000). Thirty years after promulgation of the U.C.C., these 
otherwise repealed acts continue to govern continuing transactions predating enactment of 
the U.C.C. See County of Macon v. Edgcomb, 654 N.E.2d 598, 600 (III. Ct. App. 1995); 
Braden Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 661 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Organ v. 
Value Bus. Ctr., Inc., 609 So. 2d 998, 1001--02 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
62. 9A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 10-101:5, at 763 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1994}. 
63. The 1972 transition rules are somewhat opaque: "The [1962 Code transition rules] 
shall continue to apply to the [Code as amended in 1972] and for this purpose the [old and 
new Codes] shall be considered one continuous statute." U.C.C. § 11-102 (1972) 
(amended 2000}. The drafters included this provision for those states that had not 
adopted, or had only recently adopted, the U.C.C. 9A ANDERSON, supra note 62, § 11-
102:1, at 791 (quoting Editorial Board Comment). They did not want states adopting the 
major changes embodied in the transition to the original 1962 U.C.C. to apply its rules 
retroactively. Section 11-102 contemplates that the 1972 amendments apply retroactively, 
but makes an exception for transactions predating enactment of the 1962 Code. !d. 
Some of the more substantive 1972 amendments did not apply retroactively, or 
applied only after a transition period. U.C.C. §§ 11-104 to -107 (1972} (amended 2000). 
64. ld. § 11-108. 
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most of the amendments to judicial clarification of statutory 
meaning.65 Thus, the retroactive nature of the 1972 amendments led 
to little substantive change. 
Statutes like the U.C.C. have no monopoly on change-case law 
evolves too. Judicial decisions, of course, usually claim to declare 
what the law has always been and thus presumably apply 
retroactively. It is difficult to imagine how a company could freeze 
out such run-of-the-mill case law. Suits pitting owners against other 
owners or managers over the meaning of an explicit charter term or a 
default statutory rule require courts to decide the "correct" or "true" 
pre-existing meaning of the disputed term. Such rulings do not create 
new rules in any meaningful sense and the motivation for the freeze-
barring ex ante future charter amendments affected by third party 
lawmakers-does not apply. Furthermore, the courts' interpretive 
rather than rulemaking role makes the general freeze undesirable: 
Even shareholders in corporations formed subsequent to the 
statute's passage or its first judicial construction were on 
notice that the term's meaning could evolve over time, 
because the legislature had delegated to the courts the task 
of solving the problem. Problem solving is a dynamic 
process, and hence one should not expect the law to remain 
static.66 
Similarly, decisions involving other firms that construe statutory 
defaults (or similar charter language) declare existing law, and do not 
create new law. Hence, they also seem beyond the reach of a charter 
freeze. 
Courts do on occasion make new law,67 and the motivation for 
the freeze applies just as much for these judicial innovations as for 
legislative innovations in company law. Specific charter provisions, as 
in the statutory case, would of course trump judicial innovation in 
non-mandatory rules. To guard against all possible changes, however, 
drafters could include freeze provisions to prevent all such court 
65. Despite the drafters' justification for retroactive application of the 1972 
amendments as merely declaratory of the meaning of the U.C.C., many courts have 
refused to apply even modest alterations retroactively. E.g., Am. State Bank v. White, 535 
P.2d 424, 431-32 (Kan. 1975); Third Nat'l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 380, 
382 {Mass. 1983). Thus, it seems likely that courts would have upheld freeze provisions 
locking out the effect of the 1972 amendments despite the drafters' concerted attempt 
merely to "declare" existing law as opposed to making new law. 
66. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An 
Essay on Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1689 (1989). 
67. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (replacing 
dated "block" method of valuing corporations with "any techniques or methods which are 
generally considered acceptable in the financial community"). 
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decisions from amending their charters. Some cases are easy, such as 
when courts explicitly reverse precedents or openly declare that they 
are crafting a rule from whole cloth. But between such obvious cases 
of lawmaking and the opinions discussed in the previous paragraph 
that merely interpret existing law, there will be many gray cases. 
Reasonable minds will often differ on whether or not a court has 
generated new law to which a freeze clause would apply.68 The freeze 
provision itself could specify that some trusted third party, such as a 
respected corporate lawyer, would decide whether or not a new 
decision was pregnant in pre-existing law or really struck out in a new 
direction. This party would not be obligated to defer to the court's 
view in deciding whether or not the freeze should bar the application 
of a judicial opinion to the company's charter. The enabling nature of 
company law, combined with a properly limited reading of transition 
and reserved power clauses, indicates that company charter freezes 
are likely legal as a matter of positive law. 
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: THE INTERACTION OF TRANSITION 
POLICY & ENABLING RULES 
This Part considers the public policy arguments for and against 
freeze provisions. It begins with three observations on the proper 
methods for assessing the desirability of freeze provisions. First, it 
demonstrates that conventional normative analyses of transition 
rules, designed with mandatory legal regimes in mind, are 
inappropriate for weighing the wisdom of enabling regime transition 
rules.69 Second, it shows that justifications for mandatory company 
law rules (which might support a mandatory rule against charter 
freezes) are irrelevant to the desirability of freeze provisions.7° Third, 
a major justification for mandatory rules is to deter acts adversely 
affecting third parties-so-called negative external effects. This 
68. Consider, for example, the "discovery" of the frustration of purpose doctrine in 
contract law. For instance, Krell v. Henry, 2 KB. 740, 745-49 (Eng. C.A. 1903), along with 
similar "Coronation Cases" involving contractual disputes in the aftermath of England's 
King Edward VII canceled coronation celebrations, is widely cited for creating the 
frustration of purpose doctrine. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 930 (3d ed. 1986) ("The term 'frustration ' seems to have come 
into general use, both in England and in this country, following Krell v. Henry and the 
other so-called Coronation cases .... "). Yet Krell neither explicitly nor implicitly admits 
to creating new rules to govern contracts. Rather, the court sounds as if clauses permitting 
recission for frustration of purpose have long been implicit in all contracts and cites an 
earlier case, Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B.1863), to support its holding. 
69. See infra Part III.A. 
70. See infra Part III.B. 
HeinOnline -- 79 N.C. L. Rev. 131 2000-2001
2000] COMPANY CHARTERS 131 
Article shows that permitting charter freezes does not undermine any 
positive external effects that arise when many firms use the same 
governance rules.71 
The implications of the freeze differ significantly for public 
companies versus privately-held firms. For public corporations and 
other firms with widely-dispersed ownership (e.g., some limited 
partnerships), the desirability of the freeze depends on whether state 
competition leads to efficient (race to the top) or inefficient (race to 
the bottom) statutes. If states are racing to the top, freeze provisions 
stand in the way of efficient corporate charters; conversely, if states 
are racing to the bottom, freezes protect shareholders from 
management depredation.72 Charters for smaller businesses are much 
more analogous to contracts, and there is no compelling reason to bar 
parties to such contracts from agreeing to freeze out potentially 
undesirable legislative amendments to company laws.73 Finally, this 
Article shows that, paradoxically, when the freeze makes the most 
sense as the default transition rule, it is least likely to become the 
law.74 
A. Transition Policy & the Inapplicability of Conventional 
Approaches 
The fundamental black letter rule of legal transitions, "[t]he 
principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial 
decisions operate retrospectively,"75 is not without policy justification. 
Because courts must wait for disputes to reach them before declaring 
legal principles, they cannot choose their own agenda and thus are 
less able than legislators to make significant and unexpected changes 
in the law. In addition, "judges articulate and tend to adhere to 
established principles."76 
The principle behind the differing presumptions about legislative 
and judicial transition rules seems to be that it is unfair to apply large 
and surprising new legal rules retroactively-something supposedly 
done by legislation, and only by legislation. "Fairness arguments 
about retroactivity are based on principles of equity and justice. 
Commentators have suggested that fair retroactivity rules should 
71. See infra Part III. C. 
72. See infra Part III.D. 
73. See infra Part III.E. 
74. See infra Part III.F. 
75. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994). 
76. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 571 (5th ed. 
1998). 
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provide notice of applicable legal standards and protect reliance 
interests . . . . Fairness concerns are typically raised in support of 
prospective application of new legal rules."77 
Even those who agree that fairness should determine transition 
policy have attacked the classical institutional approach to transition 
policy-legislative prospectivity and judicial retroactivity. Jill Fisch 
points out that some legislative innovations are modest and entirely 
expected78 and that some judicial innovations are significant and 
unexpected.79 Thus, she rejects the classical approach. In its place, 
she proposes an "evolutionary theory" for transition policy: 
evolutionary legal change (small, incremental transitions) should 
apply retroactively, while revolutionary change should not.80 Those 
making transition policy, then, must examine legal changes on a case-
by-case basis. Notice and reliance will depend on many contextual 
facts. How clear was the existing rule? Was change predictable? Is 
the change really novel, or just a slight tweak?81 This more nuanced 
approach, Fisch argues, would "provide notice of applicable legal 
standards and protect reliance interests ... "-in other words, it would 
be fair.82 
In an enabling system, the concerns of fairness (notice of legal 
change and reliance on existing law) are non sequiturs. Indeed, the 
freeze helps firms avoid surprises that may undermine reliance 
interests. The freeze, then, is an important tool in letting the 
legislature amend enabling rules as it pleases, leaving it to individual 
firms to opt out in advance (freeze) or ex post, or to accept new rules. 
Fisch's distinction between evolutionary and revolutionary change is 
similarly irrelevant for company law. If virtually every party in every 
firm wants a revolutionary change, the legislature undermines no 
expectations or reliance interests by "meeting demand" and changing 
the law to suit companies' desires. And again, the freeze enables the 
remaining firms to avoid surprises and maintain reliance interests. 
77. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084-85 (1997). 
78. !d. at 1109-10. For example, the minor 1972 amendments to the U.C.C., discussed 
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, in large part merely clarified the finer points of 
existing rules. 
79. Fisch, supra note 77, at 1107-08; see also, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
500 (1954) (reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), and deeming state-
sponsored segregation an Equal Protection violation); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (reversing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1, 22 (1842), and holding 
that federal courts must apply state common law in diversity cases). 
80. Fisch, supra note 77, at 1105-11. 
81. ld. 
82. Id. at 1084. 
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Unsurprisingly, those who believe that efficiency considerations, 
rather than fairness, should dictate transition policy, disagree with the 
classical justification for the legislative prospectivity and judicial 
retroactivity, as well as Fisch's equilibrium approach for fair 
transition policy.83 Louis Kaplow has made perhaps the most 
powerful statement of the efficiency reasons to apply laws 
retroactively, regardless of whether they are legislative or judicial, 
evolutionary or revolutionary.84 He argues that sound government 
policy is ultimately driven by exogenous factors such as technological 
change and citizens' preferences. These independent variables may 
change incrementally or radically and are largely unpredictable. 
Kaplow's key observation is that consumers should treat legal 
uncertainty no differently than they treat other types of uncertainty: 
they should make plans with full knowledge that changing conditions 
may lead the government to change course (i.e., change some laws). 
Any transitional relief offered by the government merely reduces 
individuals' incentives to deal with legal risk using the same tools they 
use to deal with other risk (e.g., insurance or diversification). Forcing 
people to bear the risk of their own acts is more efficient than 
subsidizing them with transition relief.85 
Kyle Logue raises one important caveat to Kaplow's efficiency 
analysis.86 To the extent the government uses laws as incentives to 
induce behavior, it must not retroactively change the rules in the 
middle of the game. Rather, lawmakers must avoid retroactivity by 
grandfathering pre-existing actors under the old rule. If the state fails 
to provide transition relief in those areas where it uses "incentive 
subsidies," it will develop a reputation for breaking promises. Once it 
has such a reputation, the state will have to offer higher subsidies to 
induce desired actions. If people know the government changes rules 
mid-stream nine times out of ten, they will demand incentives ten 
times as great as they would demand if the government always kept 
its word and provided transition relief.87 Logue emphasizes, however, 
that Kaplow's no-transition-relief rule holds outside of those areas in 
83. Fisch herself notes: "efficiency is generally viewed as favoring retroactivity." /d. 
at 1088. 
84. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 511-15 (1986). 
85. !d. at 527-32. 
86. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits 
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1129-32 (1996). 
87. See id. at 1132 (describing "inefficient increase in the default premium that the 
government must pay taxpayers to compensate them for the risk of tax transitions"). 
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which the government uses the law to create incentives for private 
actors.88 
Neither the efficiency case for retroactivity nor Logue's 
exception to it provide any grounds to suggest that the charter freeze 
is undesirable. The gist of the efficiency argument for retroactivity is 
that the law should provide private actors no relief from the risk of 
legal change just as the law generally provides no relief for most other 
risks. Society achieves optimal results when people rationally plan 
for new laws. 
This argument, however, applies only to mandatory laws; it has 
no application to enabling laws. When the government changes tax 
laws, environmental laws, and other mandatory rules, a regime of 
retroactive application forces private actors to anticipate potential 
legal change and thus tailor their economic decisions to changing 
social needs. This analysis, however, is irrelevant for enabling laws 
such as company statutes. The purpose of these laws is not to bring 
private acts into line with social needs; enabling laws merely aim to 
save costs in private transactions without any affect on third parties. 
Society is not harmed when companies decline to adopt new default 
intra-firm governance rules; if such choices had a negative impact on 
anyone outside of the company, society would make the rule 
mandatory instead of optional. 
Moreover, the charter freeze actually serves efficiency in a 
manner somewhat analogous to the efficiency argument for 
retroactivity. The freeze is a tool that can help firms manage the risk 
of legal change to enabling rules. To the extent the government 
chooses rules unsuited for some firms, efficiency analysis positively 
supports the use of charter freezes. Company law, like tax law, 
constantly changes and the point of the efficiency story is that we 
want to encourage actors, to the extent possible, to anticipate change 
and plan for it. The freeze is a very forward-looking measure to deal 
with the prospect of change; it is analogous to investing in securities 
whose value will be unaffected by changes in the tax code (instead of 
searching for loopholes that may disappear overnight). The freeze 
enables firms to insulate themselves from the risk of untoward legal 
change. 
The enabling nature of company law also makes Logue's 
"incentive exception" to efficiency analysis inapplicable to the charter 
freeze. Company law does not attempt to create incentives to alter 
88. Seeid. at1154-58. 
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behavior in specific ways; rather, business enterprise laws broadly aim 
to facilitate whatever private actors wish to do. 
Generalizing the arguments made in the previous paragraphs, 
fairness, efficiency, and incentive rationales for transition rules simply 
do not apply to laws. In mandatory areas of law in which transition 
issues are usually litigated, it is generally not possible for rules to 
leave everyone better off ex post. Although citizens will desire 
efficient tax rules ex ante (before they know how the rule will impact 
them), changes in mandatory rules usually create winners and losers. 
Thus, it is impossible to adopt any new tax law if the losers have the 
power to opt out. This is simply not true for enabling legal regimes. 
If the legislature picks the rule desired by the majority, and the 
minority can opt out, then we can have some winners while insuring 
that there are no losers. The charter freeze is a cheap and powerful 
tool for those who anticipate that they generally will not favor any 
statutory innovation. 
B. Inapplicability of Justifications for Mandatory Rules of 
Substantive Corporate Law 
Beyond general theories of legal transitions, company law 
scholarship has developed models to explain the exceptional 
circumstances in which rules governing business entities should be 
mandatory rather than enabling. This Part shows that none of the 
justifications for mandatory company laws weighs in favor of a 
mandatory rule against charter freezes.89 Indeed, some of the 
rationales suggest that the freeze should be mandatory, or at least the 
default transition rule. 
When a company's acts potentially impact third parties, the 
justification for mandatory rules is clear. Most rules regulating the 
external relations of business entities come from outside of company 
statutes. For example, firms are liable for common law torts and 
statutory violations just like any other legal person. Company 
statutes do, however, address a few external concerns. They contain 
89. Black argues forcefully that mandatory corporate law rules are irrelevant. Black, 
supra note 4, at 551-62. He argues that corporate law will usually adopt rules that most 
parties desire; that advance planning, especially choice of state of incorporation, can 
circumvent most mandatory rules; that unpopular rules are subject to great pressure for 
change; and that remaining mandatory rules concern trivial matters. For a similar 
argument, see ROMANO, supra note 40, at 90-91. If mandatory rules, as Black contends, 
are truly irrelevant, then any mandatory rule against charter freezes would be irrelevant 
(either firms did not desire the freeze, or some states permitted the mechanism). Thus, for 
the sake of argument, this Part assumes that mandatory rules are not entirely irrelevant. 
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provisions requiring firms to file addresses to facilitate service of 
process.90 Capital requirements and dividend tests, albeit weak, 
provide creditors with some protection against payments to owners 
that render the firm unable to pay its debts.91 These external affairs, 
however, are peripheral concerns for company law. Company law 
focuses primarily on internal firm governance: relations between 
managers and owners, and among owners.92 The charter freeze, 
governing transition rules affecting only owners, fits completely 
within this intra-company model and hence falls outside the narrow 
categories of company statutes containing mandatory rules. 
Coffee has noted that modern contract law imposes a few 
mandatory terms on the parties to all contracts, such as the U.C.C.'s 
requirement of good faith and fair dealing, and argues that these 
requirements should apply among the parties to company contracts 
no less than in other consensual settings.93 It is difficult to argue, 
however, that a charter freeze is a bad faith measure or that including 
one is unfair dealing. Potential owners or managers who think the 
freeze unwise or unfair can simply elect to invest or work elsewhere. 
This point, however, overlooks the possibility of opportunism 
among co-owners of a company. Original charters receive, in effect, 
unanimous support, since those who do not like the charter simply 
decline to invest. Charters can be amended by less than unanimous 
votes, however, and this raises the possibility of a majority owner 
opportunistically taking advantage of a minority. Parties may enter 
company contracts with expectations, only to see them frustrated by 
such mid-stream changes. Rational investors will foresee this 
possibility and will be wary of buying shares in the first place. In 
public corporations, dispersed and disorganized shareholders will 
worry that managers, with their control of the proxy machinery ,94 will 
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(2) (1996 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 402(a)(8) (McKinney 1986 & Supp.1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 2.02(a)(3) (1999). 
91. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 172, 174 (distributions to shareholders and 
director liability for unlawful shareholder distributions); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:26, 
12:92 (West 1994 & Supp.1999) (capital requirements); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.12 
(West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (capital requirements); TEX. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. pt. 
3 art. 3.02 (West 1996) (capital requirements); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40, 8.30 
(1999) (capital requirements). Other theories for recovery, such as fraudulent conveyance 
law, provide creditors with more effective remedies. CLARK, supra note 5, at 610. 
92. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
93. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 937 (1988) (citing 
U.C.C. § 2-719); see also Coffee, supra note 66, at 1653-54 (noting the rarity of mandatory 
intra-owner rules). 
94. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 5, at 522. 
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continually amend the charter in order to enrich themselves. In small 
enterprises, minority owners may worry that the majority will amend 
the charter to take a disproportionate share of earnings. 
Managers or majority owners raising capital can charge more for 
a given share of ownership if they can somehow assure potential 
investors that the managers or owners will not opportunistically 
amend the charter down the road, after investors have committed 
their funds.95 In the jargon of agency cost economics, managers need 
a "bonding" device to assure investors that they will not be double-
crossed later.96 If insiders cannot signal their fidelity, there is a 
"market for lemons" problem97 and trustworthy managers and owners 
will be unable to realize a premium for their sincere intent to avoid 
opportunistically altering the charter.98 Somewhat analogous to 
Odysseus tying himself to his ship's mast to enable him to resist the 
seductive song of the Sirens,99 insiders may wish to contract away 
their right to alter course in the future. 
One extreme solution, going far beyond a freeze, would be to 
make charters unamendable except by unanimous consent_HJO This 
option, however, gives every owner (no matter how small her stake) 
veto power, and may create holdout problems. In addition, 
unanimity in effect means the firm will be unable to adapt to change. 
High supermajority requirements present the same problems.101 
Jeffrey Gordon argues that less drastic state-crafted mandatory 
rules provide the most effective way for managers and majority 
owners to make credible promises to dispense with opportunistic mid-
stream charter amendments.102 The idea is that the legislature will 
change mandatory rules if they become undesirable, and that this 
95. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1399-1404 (1989); Coffee, supra note 93, at 941-50; Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1573--74 
(1989) (describing "opportunistic amendment hypothesis"). 
96. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm· Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
97. See George A. Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488-92 (1970) (describing process where, if 
higher-quality suppliers cannot credibly signal consumers of their quality (and thus 
command a higher price), they may be driven out of the market by lower-quality, lower-
cost competitors despite demand for higher-quality goods at the higher price). 
98. See Coffee, supra note 93, at 947-49. 
99. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk. XII, 39-54 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & 
Row Publishers 1967). 
100. Shareholders can always alter non-mandatory rules by unanimous vote, because 
there is no party left to object to a unanimously-adopted charter amendment. 
101. Gordon, supra note 95, at 1575. 
102. !d. 
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possibility of legislative response to changing circumstances is more 
flexible and credible than requiring unanimous or high supermajority 
votes to change a particular charter provision.103 Nevertheless, Coffee 
argues for slightly more flexibility. Rather than limit firms to a single 
mandatory rule against opportunistic amendment, Coffee thinks 
company statutes should offer "a choice among quality-controlled 
alternatives .... Opting out then needs to be quality constrained, but 
neither forbidden nor blindly accepted."104 
Whatever the proper tool for bonding against opportunistic mid-
stream charter amendments, the charter freeze presents no such 
threat of opportunism and, thus, this rationale for mandatory 
company law rules does not suggest a mandatory rule against the 
freeze. Indeed, as discussed in this Article, to the extent incumbent 
management and majority owners exert influence over the lawmaking 
process, the freeze itself may be an effective bonding device to assure 
investors that those in control will not attempt to alter the charter 
later via their friends in the legislature.105 Further, privately selected 
transition rules seem sensible for mandatory rules designed to assist 
contracting parties. Mandatory rules designed to help bond insiders 
to their promises are part of the central purpose of company law-
intra-firm governance. To the extent charter freezes are desirable for 
enabling governance rules, they likewise are desirable for this special 
species of mandatory company law provisions. 
C. Concerns External to Companies 
Mandatory rules designed to assist contracting parties are a 
relatively small part of the universe of mandatory company law rules. 
The main rationale for mandatory legal rules, whether for individuals 
or business entities, is the potential for seemingly private acts to effect 
third parties (negative external effects). Most laws designed to 
encourage actors to weigh the possibility of adverse impact on others, 
such as the common law of torts or the environmental statutes, apply 
to firms no less than flesh and blood persons. Company laws do 
include special rules designed to protect creditors. The first part of 
103. Note that a rule that requires a supermajority vote is effectively somewhere 
between a purely enabling and a mandatory rule. To see this, consider the extreme case of 
a rule requiring unanimous shareholder consent to opt out. In a public corporation, with 
numerous shareholders, attaining every last vote is virtually impossible and thus the rule is 
effectively immutable. Generally, the higher the supermajority vote required to opt out of 
a statutory default, the more closely the rule approaches immutability. 
104. Coffee, supra note 93, at 972-74. 
105. See infra Part III.D, III.E. 
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this Section shows that the freeze, far from threatening creditor 
interests, extends further protection (again) as a device for bonding 
the firm to take some measures and forego others. 
The second part of this Section deals with the much less common 
phenomenon of positive external effects. Common use of a set of 
legal rules, no less than common use of a given keyboard layout or 
computer operating system, may generate benefits based on common 
use alone-past, continuing, and future. Charter freezes facilitate 
"defections" from the use of new statutory default provisions. 
Intuition, and some scholarship,106 suggest that the possibility of such 
defection can undermine the benefits of common use of company 
laws. The Section concludes by rejecting this assertion and arguing 
that charter freezes pose no threat to the positive external effects that 
result from common use of statutory defaults. 
1. Creditor Protection & the Freeze 
When making loans, creditors must weigh, inter alia, the 
possibility that the legislature will change creditor protection rules 
and increase the likelihood of default. Legal change, no less than 
recession or new competition, poses a risk to borrowers' financial 
health. Seen in this light, charter freezes reduce one risk faced by 
creditors: automatic change in the borrowers' charter imposed by the 
legislature. Indeed, creditors might request a freeze as a limited form 
of protection from the firm later lobbying the legislature to change 
the contract between the creditor and the firm. Creditors could 
supplement this protection by obtaining promises that borrowers will 
not engage in certain activities permitted by existing or future 
company law. 
Creditors, at least of large public corporations, can and do 
impose precisely such restrictions in omnipresent bond covenants. 
The most common bond covenants, such as restrictions on share 
issuance and repurchase, further debt, payment of dividends, changes 
in board of directors, mergers, and the sale of substantially all assets, 
effectively freeze some provisions of the borrower's charter.107 These 
contractual promises trump any legislative change in default rules. 
106. See infra text accompanying note 124. 
107. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 741}-42 
{1997) (summarizing event risk covenants governing share issuance and repurchase, 
mergers, asset sales, changes in board of directors, and dividend policy); Clifford W. Smith 
& Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117, 123 (1979) (listing 
most common types of bond covenants). 
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Far from undermining creditor reliance, charter freezes extend 
borrowing firms' credibility in bonding with creditors and forsaking 
the opportunity to take later steps that increase the likelihood of 
default. 
2. Network Externalities 
The very fact that many firms use common rules of governance 
and that they, along with new firms, will continue to use them creates 
benefits for all-so-called network externalities.108 "A product 
exhibits network externalities when its value to a consumer depends 
on the number of other consumers that use that product (or a 
compatible one)."109 Computer operating systems are a canonical 
example of network externalities. Knowledge of a given computer 
environment is more valuable if many others use the same 
environment. So too with company law. "[F]irms that use a 
particular contract term form a 'network' analogous to the network of 
PC users ... .'mo 
Network externalities are one of two general categories of 
positive external effects generated by common usages, denoting 
"advantages ... available to a finn that adopts a contract term that is 
or will become contemporaneously used by many firms for a 
significant period of time."111 This does not include "positive 
externalities that earlier users of a contract term confer on later 
users," which form a separate category called learning externalities.112 
While network externalities run between all participants, learning 
externalities implicitly involve subsidies conferred by earlier users on 
later users.113 Thus, to take a legal example, past precedents on a 
particular statutory provision are learning externalities that benefit 
new companies; the prospect of additional precedents in the future 
are network externalities created by new as well as existing firms. 
108. See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 
20 J. PUB. EcoN. 231, 231-33 (1983); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base & 
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncments, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
940, 940-43 (1986). 
109. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757, 763 (1995). 
110. ld. at 775. "Other classic examples include videocassette recorders, typewriter 
keyboards, telecommunications equipment, and thread sizes on nuts and bolts." Id. at 763 
n.14. 
111. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 107, at 725. 
112. !d. at 724. 
113. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 350 
(1996). 
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Common use of company governance provisions creates a host of 
benefits. Bodies of court opinions construing particular terms serve 
to "reduce uncertainty by providing substantive detail . . . or by 
providing a procedural safe harbor."114 Unambiguous terms in turn 
help foster common business practices that reduce costs. Further, 
clearly understood rules enhance competition for legal services by 
making lawyers interchangeable, just as widespread use of Microsoft 
Windows and applications running under it reduces the cost of hiring 
workers with such skills.115 Finally, investors will feel more 
comfortable with well-defined governance rules and hence will pay 
more for securities issued by firms using provisions clarified through 
long lines of precedent.116 
Numerous dispersed private actors do not always settle on 
optimal standards. The process of choosing standards may go awry in 
at least three ways.117 First, private actors may settle on a standard 
that is least costly at the outset, but that yields network externalities 
so much below alternatives that, even discounting to present value, it 
is inefficient in the long run. Second, private actors may choose 
standards leading to excess uniformity. Third, dispersed actors may 
settle on the opposite: excessively divergent standards. These latter 
two possibilities require further discussion, as they have important 
implications for the desirability of the freeze. 
To understand how excessive uniformity can occur, imagine 
that there are two distinct types of participants (T1 and T2) who 
would choose different standards ex ante (S1 and S2) based on their 
distinct preferences. If most of the early participants are type T1, S1 
will predominate. Although T2 entrants inherently prefer S2, widely-
used S1 offers more than offsetting learning and network benefits. If 
each T2 latecomer could be sure that current and future T2 entrants 
would choose S2, then each would choose S2. It is often prohibitively 
expensive for dispersed participants to coordinate their behavior, 
however, and each isolated T2 latecomer will likely choose the 
established S1 over the risky S2. 
114. Klausner, supra note 109, at 777. 
115. See id. at 782 n.82. 
116. See id. at 780. There is evidence that underwriters tell firms to use standard terms 
and that unusual terms may scare off buyers. Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: 
The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 V AND. L. REv. 133, 
152-58 (1989). 
117. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 107, at 734-36. 
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This excess uniformity story may explain the failure of 
specialized close corporation codes.118 Although a number of states, 
including Delaware, have enacted corporate law provisions tailored 
specifically for privately-held firms, the overwhelming majority of 
such firms have rejected these offerings and instead use general 
corporate laws designed for public corporations.119 This empirical 
truth is hard to square with the observations that close corporations 
are significantly different than public corporations120 and that 
legislatures design general corporation statutes for public 
corporations.121 Thus, there should be demand for specialized close 
corporation rules of governance that provide a better fit for such 
firms than statutes designed for quite different entities. 
This lack of demand for close corporation rules partly results 
from the fact that public corporations predate close corporations.122 
Close corporations thus face the distorted choice faced by the T2 
entrants. Although special close corporation statutes offer a set of 
preferable rules, they are used by relatively few firms and hence offer 
fewer learning externalities in the short run and create a significant 
risk that they will offer fewer network externalities in the long run. 
Close corporations, then, may select general corporate law rules 
despite unanimous preference for tailor-made rules. Commentary on 
reaction to Delaware's special close corporation provisions seem to 
tell just such a tale. 
[S]tatutory close corporations have not found particular 
favor with practitioners. Practitioners have for the most part 
viewed the complex statutory provisions underlying the 
purportedly simplified operational procedures for close 
corporations as legal quicksand of uncertain depth and have 
118. See Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-in: Limited Liability Companies and 
the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362, 1386-
91 {1995). 
119. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS § 1.19 {3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1997). Interestingly, Delaware and other 
states with special close corporation codes did not mandate that existing close 
corporations migrate to the new code. This is inconsistent with the general rule that 
changes in the company statute effectively are inserted to all existing firms of a given type. 
It is consistent with the general rule that while minor statutory changes apply 
retroactively, major legislative innovation generally does not. See supra Part III.A. 
120. See supra Part liLA; see also CLARK, supra note 5, at 761 (describing application 
of rules designed for public corporations to close corporations as "clumsy"). 
121. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. 
REv. 259,268 (1967) (declaring that historically, corporation statutes "were adopted with 
the publicly held corporation almost exclusively in mind"). 
122. See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and 
Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 559,561 (1984). 
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adopted the view that the objectives sought by the 
subchapter are achievable for their clients with considerably 
less uncertainty by cloaking a conventionally created 
corporation with the panoply of charter provisions, transfer 
restrictions, by-laws, stockholders' agreements, buy-sell 
arrangements, irrevocable proxies, voting trusts or other 
contractual mechanisms which were and remain the 
traditional method for accomplishing the goals sought by the 
close corporation provisions.123 
143 
This leads to "excess uniformity," in the sense that, if the close 
corporations coordinate their behavior at reasonable cost, they would 
all elect to use laws better suited to their needs. 
Private, dispersed actors may settle on the opposite of excess 
uniformity-excess diversity. If there is no coordinating mechanism, 
then a thousand isolated actors may choose a thousand different 
standards. Gordon defends mandatory corporate law rules in part 
based on this insight, arguing that corporate law is a public good with 
positive external effects that would be destroyed by excessive 
customization of governance rules.124 Mandatory rules assure some 
minimal common core of company law and hence may be desirable, 
despite other drawbacks, as a means to prevent disintegration of the 
standard company contract. This argument applies with even greater 
force to the freeze, which will tend to create smaller groups of firms 
sharing common governance rules. 
Michael Klausner argues convincingly that, in the context of 
company law, Gordon's fear is misplaced. 
Whereas Gordon argues that an individual firm has an 
incentive to customize at the expense of firms already using 
the common term, [network externality analysis] 
demonstrates that the opposite concern is actually greater. 
A firm choosing between a term already in common use and 
a customized term may be too strongly inclined to opt for the 
network externalities immediately available from the 
former .... 
The presence of network externalities offers a slim basis 
for the use of mandatory rules in corporate law. To the 
extent that coordination is needed, a default term can be 
used.125 
123. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACfiCE 
§ 43.01, at 43-1 {1996) (emphasis added). 
124. See Gordon, supra note 95, at 1567. 
125. Klausner, supra note 109, at 835-36. 
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A slightly different way to make the same point is to note the 
efficiency of the coexistence of corporations and partnerships, each 
having long served business owners with different preferences. A 
single-minded focus on network externalities would lead lawmakers 
to eliminate all but one business entity in order to generate the largest 
possible mass of precedents behind one set of rules. 
The network benefits of complete homogeneity, however, are 
likely outweighed by the value of some amount of choice in selecting 
a business entity. Company law must "promote an optimal balance 
of uniformity and diversity in corporate contract terms."126 Thus, 
legislatures should provide, and indeed long have provided, a menu of 
business entity options, each designed for a set of actors with 
relatively uniform preferences. This set -of options serves 
heterogeneity among enterprises in general terms; charter freezes 
serve heterogeneity in more specific ways. Once a firm has selected a 
type, it may wish to exercise greater than normal control over the 
evolution of its charter. If the legislature does its job, by definition 
only a minority of firms will feel the need to preemptively reject 
alterations of default ru1es. 
D. Public Corporations: Which Way Are We Racing? 
The policy analyses of the last three Sections provide no grounds 
to oppose charter freezes and relatively weak support for such 
provisions. General transition policy simply did not apply to enabling 
transitions. Justifications for mandatory rules of corporate law, 
including external effects, weigh in favor of the freeze. Evaluating the 
normative desirability of permitting charter freezes requires us to step 
down from the perspective of high theory and examine the context of 
company governance. 
The key distinction is between widely-owned public entities and 
privately-owned firms. The desirability of permitting public 
corporations to freeze their charters turns on whether competition 
between states for lucrative public incorporation fees and corporate 
tax revenues leads to ru1es favoring management or shareholders. 
This is the famous "race" debate among corporate law scholars. Until 
fairly recently, most scholars accepted Carey's landmark thesis that 
competition for corporate charters led to a "race to the bottom": 
states vying to win reincorporations by favoring management over 
shareholders in their corporate statutes.127 The pejorative label 
126. !d. at765;seeid. at831-32,837-38. 
127. See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
HeinOnline -- 79 N.C. L. Rev. 145 2000-2001
2000] COMPANY CHARTERS 145 
"bottom" is normatively appropriate: rules favoring management are 
a license to steal from shareholders in myriad ways (e.g., self-dealing, 
excessive compensation, and expropriating attractive business 
opportunities). These modes of theft are just as inefficient as simple 
property theft, discouraging enterprise and raising monitoring costs. 
A growing chorus of scholars has challenged this thesis, arguing 
that markets, especially capital markets, constrain opportunistic 
reincorporation jurisdictions favoring management. Investors 
(especially large institutional investors) know which states have such 
rules, and will pay less for the shares of firms incorporating in these 
states which in turn raises firms' cost of capital and makes them less 
competitive. Reincorporating in states that cater to their welfare, as 
opposed to shareholder welfare, may damage managers' reputations 
for trustworthiness. These market monitoring mechanisms, so the 
argument goes, put pressure on managers to incorporate in states 
with rules favoring shareholders. This in turn causes states to engage 
in a "race to the top": a continual quest for efficient rules that cater 
to investors.128 
The outcome of this debate is dispositive of the charter freeze's 
desirability for public firms. If states are engaged in a race to the 
bottom, then statutory innovations will usually harm shareholders. In 
such a world, the charter freeze is a powerful tool for policing 
management, because all changes to the charter must garner at least a 
majority shareholder vote. Management's control of the proxy 
machinery, along with dispersed shareholders' rational apathy, may 
enable management to obtain such votes, but the freeze at least forces 
a vote. If, on the other hand, states are engaged in a race to the top, 
then management would use charter freezes to reject statutory 
innovation favoring shareholders. Management's control of meeting 
agendas might prevent shareholders from ever obtaining a vote on 
desirable new default provisions. 
Unfortunately the "race" debate remains unresolved. The race 
to the top thesis rests on the assertion that the market for corporate 
securities is relatively efficient. This means that security prices reflect 
Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 663-70 (1974). The idea of a race to the bottom, along with 
the terminology, dates back at least to Justice Brandeis's dissent in Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 
517, 557-QO (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
128. For an early attack on the race to the bottom thesis, see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State 
Law, Shareholder Protection, & the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 
258..Q2 (1977); see also Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections 
on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 915-22 
(1982) (questioning the accuracy of the race-to-the-bottom thesis). For a thorough 
defense of the race to the top thesis, see ROMANO, supra note 40, 14-17. 
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at least all publicly-known information, including each state's 
corporate laws. There is strong empirical evidence to support this 
version of the efficient markets hypothesis.129 In addition, a series of 
statistical studies ("event studies") have demonstrated that the stock 
prices of firms do not generally decline before or after they 
reincorporate in Delaware (the state winning the race, up or down) 
and may actually rise.130 The fact that shareholders suing 
management of Delaware corporations invariably choose Delaware's 
courts, when they have the option of selecting another venue, also 
supports the race to the top thesis.131 
One skeptic, however, argues that even capital markets suffer 
from some inefficiencies, giving managers the ability to engage in at 
least modest levels of self-interested behavior without noticeably 
impacting the firm's cost of capital.132 Executives can also use their 
control of meeting agendas to package self-interested measures with 
"sweeteners," such as special dividends, and thus obtain shareholders' 
consent to their own exploitation. Further, there are some 
complications with the event studies cited by race to the top 
proponents. Firms often reincorporate either right before or soon 
after good news, explaining any rise in price observed on 
reincorporation in Delaware.133 It is possible (in a race to the bottom 
world) that share prices would rise even more if firms did not 
reincorporate in the wake of good news.134 Note too that, if a race to 
the bottom is complete (i.e., all states have roughly similar pro-
management corporations statutes), we would not expect to see much 
change in share price on reincorporation because firms merely would 
be moving from one management-friendly jurisdiction to another.135 
Further complicating the debate, the race need not be entirely to 
the top or bottom. On some issues, markets may help shareholders 
curtail such behavior. There are strong reasons to believe that 
corporate voting rules are efficient.136 On the other hand, even the 
129. See, e.g. , RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 290-300 (4th ed. 1991). 
130. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 213-15 (surveying event studies and 
collecting cites); ROMANO, supra note 40, at 20-22 (summarizing results from event 
studies literature and finding support for the race to the bottom thesis). 
131. ROMANO, supra note 40, at 41. 
132. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1458-67 (1992). 
133. See id. at 1449. 
134. See id. 
135. ld. at 1450. 
136. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 70-72 (discussing voting). 
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most ardent race to the top advocates admit that the rash of anti-
takeover measures enacted since the mid-1980s are inefficient and 
serve largely to entrench incumbent management.137 
Strong evidence exists that managers of large public corporations 
lobbied for these anti-takeover provisions.138 Their enactment 
illustrates strikingly just how much statutory amendments are charter 
amendments obtained by alternative procedures. "[S]ince most 
restrictions imposed by [valid anti-takeover] statutes can be adopted 
voluntarily by charter amendment without an authorizing statute, 
management's lobbying for legislation clearly implies that it believes 
it is easier to convince a state legislature than shareholders of an anti-
takeover provision's desirability."139 
When management can make an end-run around shareholders 
simply by obtaining new statutory provisions, the attractiveness of 
charter freezes is obvious. As a first cut, we might posit that 
shareholders should freeze out changes only in those areas where 
there was a race to the bottom driven by management's influence in 
the legislature. Indeed, race to the top advocates have suggested 
what amounts to limited charter freezes to address the problem posed 
by legislation enacted at the behest of management-the requirement 
that shareholders affirmatively opt in to new statutory defaults that 
replace mandatory rules, rather than automatic application (as was 
the case with almost all anti-takeover statutes): 
[W]here important changes in the relationship between 
shareholders and management are at issue, legislation that 
relaxes mandatory rules should always require an 
affirmative shareholder decision to 'opt in' to the change 
rather than merely permitting shareholders to opt out. This 
will prevent management from extracting more from the 
legislative process than it could obtain from the charter 
amendment process.140 
Romano similarly, but more narrowly, argues that, at least as to anti-
takeover statutes, legislatures should require firms to take affirmative 
steps to opt in, instead of making anti-takeover rules effective for 
firms until they affirmatively opt out.141 
137. See id. at 221-22; ROMANO, supra note 40, at 84. 
138. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 80-83. 
139. !d. at 84; see also Black, supra note 4, at 568 (agreeing with Romano); William 
Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715,752 (1998) (same). 
140. Gordon, supra note 95, at 1555. 
141. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 56. 
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Limited freezes, however, are prey to the unending creativity of 
the legal mind. There is always "the risk that lawmakers will provide 
new options that weren't anticipated when a company went public. 
[Supermajority voting] provisions can't protect shareholders of 
existing companies against this risk."142 A general charter freeze 
prevents all creative evasion of shareholder voting requirements in 
one fell swoop. Limited freezes simply do not go far enough. 
It is possible, at the other extreme, to enact overly stringent 
versions of the freeze. Gordon uses the term "freeze" to describe a 
charter made absolutely unamendable.143 Although he does not seem 
to contemplate freezing out legislative change, it is conceptually easy 
to extend his freeze to preclude legislative as well as shareholder 
charter amendments. This is in effect a unanimity rule. If everyone 
agrees, they can alter the charter (or merge, or dissolve) at will. 
There is nobody left to complain and sue. Gordon and others have 
rejected unanimity rules as too inflexible. Because it is so difficult to 
obtain unanimous approval for any measure, the firm likely will 
forego many desirable statutory amendments in the process of 
freezing out undesirable ones.144 
A general charter freeze, requiring only a majority (or perhaps a 
modest supermajority) vote to include statutory amendments in the 
charter, strikes a balance between locking out all, or accepting all, 
statutory change. It gives shareholders a chance to accept desirable 
amendments and to reject undesirable amendments that benefit only 
management. It is important to reiterate that if any portion of the 
corporate statute is subject to a race to the bottom (e.g., anti-takeover 
measures), freezing only those portions of the charter will not be 
effective because management will always be able to find creative, 
formally distinct provisions to achieve self-interested ends. A general 
charter freeze is thus desirable for public corporations if there is even 
partial truth in the race to the bottom hypothesis. 
Even if states engage in a race to the top as to every facet of 
corporate law, shareholders in public corporations still have two 
reasons to enact a general charter freeze: the self-interest of lawyers' 
groups and the incompetence of legislatures. The bar is very 
influential in drafting corporate laws, nowhere more so than in 
142. See Black, supra note 4, at 567--68. 
143. See Gordon, supra note 95, at 1575, 1580-81. 
144. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1856-58 (1989); 
Gordon, supra note 95, at 1582-84. 
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Delaware.145 Corporate lawyers in many ways have economic 
interests at odds with shareholders. They have incentives to favor 
rules that require extensive legal planning and cause litigation-
especially expensive, protracted litigation. Jonathan Macey and 
Geoffry Miller, the first to explore interest group motives in detail in 
the context of Delaware law, concluded: 
[T]he Delaware bar is likely to be more successful than 
other groups in transforming Delaware's competitive 
advantage into profits. This group enjoys significant 
advantages in organizational structure as well as economies 
of scale in obtaining information about the effects of 
changes in Delaware law on the demand for corporate 
charters and legal services. In addition, the bar is not 
plagued with the same start-up costs and free-rider problems 
that confront other groups. The bar is not the only interest 
group within Delaware that benefits from the state's 
dominance in the market for corporate charters, but its gains 
are disproportionately high relative to those of the groups 
with which it competes.146 
To the extent legislation benefits lawyers instead of shareholders, the 
freeze may serve as an effective screening device. Managers as well 
as shareholders stand to gain by freezing out statutes that impose 
excessive legal costs on public corporations. 
Finally, shareholders and managers might enact a charter freeze 
to protect their corporation from consistently inefficient rules enacted 
by an incompetent legislature. Although this is directly at odds with 
the purpose of company law, there is no guarantee that every 
legislature at all times enacts default rules desired by most firms. The 
fact that Delaware's Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in 
both houses of its legislature to amend its corporate code may reflect 
worry about inappropriate legislation.147 Admittedly, the competition 
145. See ROMANO, supra note 40, at 60; Andrew G.T. Moore II, A Brief History of the 
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware and the Amendatory Process, in 1 R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTII & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS H-19 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997) ("It is a hallmark of the 
General Assembly's respect for the expertise of the [Delaware State Bar Association 
Section on General Corporate Law] that it will rarely consider or adopt any changes in the 
General Corporation Law which have not been sponsored by the Section."). 
146. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 522-23 (1987); see also Carney, supra note 
139, at 720-28, 737-41 (analyzing incentives of corporate bar in jurisdictions other than 
Delaware); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 127, 158-62 (1997) (arguing that unanimous decisions by Delaware Supreme 
Court benefit Delaware corporate bar). 
147. DEL. CONST. art. IX,§ 1. 
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among states for public corporation chartering business provides a 
powerful market corrective to senseless legislation; firms can always 
reincorporate in a state with wiser legislators.148 Nevertheless, the 
freeze offers additional protection when shareholders and executives 
of public corporations fear foolish corporate law innovation. 
E. Close Corporations & Other Privately-Held Firms 
There is little if any state competition for the charters of small, 
privately-held firms, because they usually operate in only one state 
and the costs of incorporating elsewhere exceed the benefits.149 Thus, 
there is less pressure on legislatures to enact efficient governance 
rules, and private firms have more to fear from legislative ineptitude. 
Private firms may find charter freezes a helpful defensive measure. 
Even if the legislature is competent, its focus on public corporations 
often means that close corporations are forgotten step-children. 150 If 
legislators tailor corporate law for public corporations, then private 
firms have another reason to freeze out automatic change to their 
charters and individually evaluate each legislative measure.151 
More generally, if a legislature is incompetent in choosing default 
governance rules for small enterprises, the freeze can serve as a signal 
of consumer (firm) disapproval. Public firms unhappy with a state's 
corporate law simply reincorporate elsewhere (usually in Delaware). 
Private firms have no real exit option. If a majority of a given type of 
business entity enact charter freezes, a strong signal would be sent to 
the legislature that its statute is failing to achieve its fundamental 
purpose-providing default rules that most firms desire. 
Even if legislatures generally select efficient rules for close firms, 
a large minority of these firms may wish to reject many new 
provisions. Close firms, to a much greater extent than their public 
counterparts, are products of explicit bargaining, with give and take 
on a variety of issues. Changes in statutory defaults are likely to 
148. Black, supra note 4, at 574-75. 
149. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 10 WASH. U. L.Q. 
365, 372-78 (1992). 
150. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text {discussing corporate law's 
traditional focus on large public corporations). 
151. Ayres demonstrates that courts have effectively voided many rules that are 
inappropriate for close corporations. Ayres, supra note 149, at 377; see ROMANO, supra 
note 40, at 26. Interestingly, legislatures have usually acquiesced, either by enacting a 
statute following the innovative decision or by refusing to legislatively reverse the 
decision. This solution to the problem of corporate rules unfit for close corporations, 
however, raises a similar problem: later courts may inappropriately apply the innovative 
rule for close corporations to public corporations. 
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upset complex compromises embodied in the charters of closely-held 
firms. Vestal demonstrates that the RUPA changes important 
fiduciary duty and dissolution rules.152 Though the Act gives existing 
partnerships a window of time to alter their charters before the 
RUPA governs them, a looming (mandatory) transition153 will give 
partners benefitting under new rules a powerful negotiating position. 
Based on the primacy of partners' intent, as embodied in the explicit 
and default rules specified in their charter, Vestal argues that 
partnerships formed under the UP A should remain governed by the 
UPA despite a state's adoption of the RUPA.154 
Vestal's prescribed transition rule is much like a charter freeze-
it maintains an older set of default rules for existing firms when the 
legislature adopts a new set of default rules. Of course a company 
could achieve the same effect by including specific rules in its charter 
on every issue contemplated in the statute; as discussed earlier, such 
explicit terms trump both old and new statutory defaults.155 Forcing 
firms to take this step, however, imposes much of the transactions 
cost that company statutes are supposed to eliminate. Charter freezes 
allow firms to achieve the same ends with one sentence: "To the 
extent permitted by law, this firm elects to be covered by the [entity] 
statute as it existed on the date this entity was formed." 
As the product of specific bargains, close company charters 
exhibit greater heterogeneity than their public counterparts. Thus, 
we would expect a higher percent of them to reject statutory defaults. 
Even if the legislature chooses perfectly, then, many close firms 
whose governance rule preferences diverge from the plurality of their 
peers will want to opt out of the statute. Firms especially averse to 
statutory innovation are in the best position to identify themselves, 
and a charter freeze allows them to plan ahead cheaply. Contract is 
the first and best source of company governance rules, and the freeze 
is a powerful, forward-looking tool for effecting the parties' intent. 
Furthermore, widespread use of charter freezes might give legislators 
more room to innovate. When they know that most firms wary of 
change have enacted freezes, they can adopt rules desired by the 
152. See Allan W. Vestal, Should the RUPA of 1994 Really be Retroactive?, 50 Bus. 
LAW. 267,274-79 (1994). 
153. REVISED UNIF. P'SIDP Acr § 1006, 6 U.L.A. 122 (1995 & Supp. 2000). The 
ULLCA has almost exactly the same transition rule. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr. 
§ 1205(b), 6A U.L.A. 507 (1995 & Supp. 2000). 
154. See Vestal, supra note 152, at 285-88 (arguing for a "coexistence model," with 
UPA governing existing partnerships and RUPA governing partnerships formed in 
future). 
155. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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plurality that would, absent charter freezes, pose problems to firms 
with relatively unusual preferences. 
In addition to these special problems, close corporations share 
some of public corporations' fears about legislative innovation. Bar 
lobbying groups play no less a role in shaping private company law 
than they do for public entities. Ribstein and Kobayashi make a 
strong case that lawyers involved in drafting and promulgating the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) included a host 
of rules likely to require legal advice and foster litigation. 156 The 
RUPA may suffer from the same defects.157 Neither statute has been 
adopted widely.158 Just as shareholders in public corporations may 
worry about the legislative clout of management, minority owners in 
close companies may be wary of majority owners' ability to obtain 
legislatively what they cannot enact within the firm. Majority owners 
can use corporate funds and pooled clout via business groups to lobby 
for measures that would require a supermajority vote or for measures 
that would look like a breach of fiduciary duty if enacted by an 
interested party. 
F. Should the Freeze be the Default Transition Rule for Corporate 
Law? 
The previous sections concluded that there may be good reasons 
to permit both public and private firms to adopt charter freezes. This 
Section considers the next natural question: Should the freeze be the 
default transition rule inserted into charters? To restate the question, 
should firms be required to state explicitly in their charters that they 
wish to adopt legislative innovations automatically? 
At first blush, this is a shocking default rule. It seems 
tantamount to a legislative declaration that "in the future, we are 
likely to promulgate company default rules that most firms would not 
choose." If the legislature had such serious doubts about its own 
wisdom, making freezes the default transition rule would help most 
firms block undesirable legal change. It seems unlikely that any 
legislature would take such a dim view of its (and its successors') 
abilities. Moreover, such an inept legislature might well be better 
served by getting out of the business of providing company statutes 
altogether. 
156. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 963-68 (discussing mandatory fiduciary 
duties, liability for wrongful distributions, derivative-like member suits, and the indefinite 
standard for dissolution). 
157. See Ribstein, Revised Uniform Partnership Act, supra note 45, at 79-81. 
158. See supra note 8. 
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It is possible, however, that in certain circumstances the freeze 
may be a sensible default rule. As in Part TILE, it is helpful to 
analyze close and public companies separately. There are at least two 
situations in which a legislature confident in its abilities might 
rationally select the freeze as a default rule. First, if there is extreme 
diversity among close firms, the plurality that favor many default 
rules may be quite small. In this case, most firms will wish to reject 
most statutory innovation, thus making the charter freeze a sensible 
default. Second, we may need to distinguish between relatively 
sophisticated close firms that receive legal advice when drafting and 
amending their charters and unsophisticated firms that do it on their 
own. Lawyers for the former group are in a good position to choose 
whether or not to insert a freeze provision based on their familiarity 
with clients. Unsophisticated firms, however, are unlikely to think 
about the possibility of future legal change. Thus, the legislature 
should focus on unsophisticated close firms in deciding whether or 
not to select the freeze as a default. If, for example, most close firms 
are sophisticated and have a systematic preference for rules that do 
not suit unsophisticated firms, the freeze makes sense as a default 
rule. Sophisticated firms will contract around the default, and the 
freeze will protect unsophisticated parties from new rules unsuited to 
their needs. Note that under the stated assumptions, this result is not 
limited to freeze provisions: it may be rational to draft the entire 
statute to suit the needs of those without expert advice. The 
assumptions seem to suggest that there may be a need for two distinct 
company statutes. If the legislature provides distinct statutes catering 
to the special needs of each group, the freeze rio longer would be a 
sensible default rule. 
For public companies, again the key empirical question is 
whether legislatures generally enact corporate laws favorable to 
management (in a race to the bottom) or to owners (in a race to the 
top). In a race to the top world, the freeze is an undesirable default, 
as it enables management to evade statutory changes that likely 
benefit owners. Conversely, under a race to the bottom, the freeze is 
an efficient default rule; it prevents managers from using their lackeys 
in the legislature to enact provisions allowing them to expropriate 
corporate wealth. There is, however, a paradox here. By assumption 
in a race to the bottom world, lawmakers would not choose a default 
transition rule favorable to shareholders. Instead, they would choose 
the existing default-automatic insertion of statutory innovations 
(favoring management) into charters. 
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Finally, if the bar plays a significant role in shaping company law 
to its own advantage, it is unlikely to choose the freeze as the default 
transition rule. The freeze helps firms evade statutory amendments 
that force them to use lawyers more often (e.g., to comply with 
inefficient formalities) and that breed litigation among parties to the 
company contract. Such an outcome clearly is not in the legal 
profession's self-interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The last subpart seemingly turns company law on its head. This 
Article opened by acknowledging that state business entity statutes 
are "off-the-rack" governance rules that most owners prefer. The 
state saves each firm the cost of drafting a company charter from 
scratch. As the normative analysis of Part III revealed, however, 
reality may diverge from this ideal. Instead of adopting efficient rules 
that owners would prefer, influential groups (managers, majority 
shareholders, and lawyers) warp the contours of company laws. 
Under such adverse circumstances, owners will find charter freezes 
very appealing. 
In the complex and continually evolving legal environment, it is 
unlikely that owners face legal changes uniformly harmful to their 
interests. It is equally unlikely, however, that changes in company 
law always benefit owners. The legal world is more nuanced. States 
may be engaged in a race to the top on some public corporate law 
issues and a race to the bottom on others. The legal profession may 
enact self-interested business entity provisions at some times, while 
bowing to firm demand at others. 
In addition to these general problems, specific firms may have 
their own individuated reasons for fearing amendments to company 
laws. Each company is in the best position to gauge the threat posed 
by legal change, and to deploy protective legal mechanisms. Part III 
argued that there is no policy reason to forbid each firm from 
choosing its own transition policy for enabling company law rules. 
The freeze is simply one of the choices that firms should have to deal 
with potentially harmful alterations to company laws. 
Charter freezes, along with other tools to manage the risk of 
legal change, are particularly important given the current flux in 
company laws. Partnership law may be shifting from the UP A to the 
RUPA. Legislatures continue to reshape LLC statutes significantly. 
Corporate law is more volatile than in earlier eras. Firms, thus, have 
strong grounds to argue that charter freezes are permissible tools for 
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insulating themselves from the risks of untoward business entity 
legislation. 
